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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant ACM Partnership ("ACM"), through its tax 
matters partner Southampton-Hamilton Company 
("Southampton"), appeals from a decision of the United 
States Tax Court dated June 12, 1997. The Tax Court's 
jurisdiction rested on I.R.C. SS 7442, 6213 and 6226 based 
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on appellant's timely filing of a petition seeking 
redetermination of a deficiency and review of a Final 
Partnership Administrative Adjustment. Appellate 
jurisdiction rests on I.R.C. S 7482(a)(1). Venue is proper 
pursuant to I.R.C. S 7482(b)(1)(A) as Southampton 
maintained its principal place of business within this 
circuit at the time it filed its petition. For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, dismiss the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue's cross appeal, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This appeal concerns the tax consequences of a series of 
transactions executed between November 1989 and 
December 1991 by appellant ACM, a partnership formed on 
October 27, 1989, with its principal place of business in 
Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. Each of ACM's three 
partners was created as a subsidiary of a larger entity 
several days before ACM's formation. Southampton was 
incorporated under Delaware law on October 24, 1989, as 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Colgate-Palmolive Company 
("Colgate"), an international consumer products company. 
Kannex Corporation N.V. ("Kannex") was incorporated 
under Netherlands Antilles law on October 25, 1989, as an 
entity controlled by Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. ("ABN"), 
a major Dutch bank. ACM's third partner, Merrill Lynch 
MLCS, Inc. ("MLCS"), was incorporated under Delaware law 
on October 27, 1989, as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Merrill Lynch Capital Services, an affiliate of the financial 
services holding company Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. ("Merrill 
Lynch"). See ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 2189, 2190, 2197 (1997); app. at 81-84, 89-91. 
 
A. The Proposed Partnership 
 
The concept behind the ACM partnership originated in a 
proposal which Merrill Lynch presented to Colgate in May 
1989. During the previous year, Colgate had reported 
$104,743,250 in long-term capital gains which were 
attributable in significant part to the sale of its wholly 
owned subsidiary The Kendall Company ("Kendall"). See 
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app. at 74-75. Colgate had considered and rejected several 
proposals to reduce the tax liability arising from those 1988 
capital gains, see app. at 664, when Merrill Lynch 
representative Macauley Taylor approached Colgate's 
Assistant Treasurer Hans Pohlschroeder in May 1989 and 
proposed an investment partnership that would generate 
capital losses which Colgate could use to offset some of its 
1988 capital gains. App. at 674-76, 784, 965.1 
 
Pohlschroeder related the plan to Colgate's Vice President 
of Taxation Steven Belasco, who expressed reservations 
because the plan entailed substantial costs, might not be 
recognized for tax purposes, and did not seem to serve 
Colgate's non-tax business purposes, and thus might not 
be well-received by Colgate's legal, financial, and 
accounting departments who would be required to 
participate in the plan. See 73 T.C.M. at 2191; app. at 
1234-36. Colgate consulted a law firm for advice on the 
proposed transaction, which the law firm summarized as 
follows: 
 
       A (a foreign entity), B, and C form the ABC Partnership 
       (ABC) on June 30, 1989 with respective cash 
       contributions of $75, $24 and $1. Immediately 
       thereafter, ABC invests $100 in short-term securities 
       which it sells on December 30, 1989, to an unrelated 
       party. The fair market value and face amount of the 
       short-term securities at the time of the sale is still 
       $100. In consideration for the sale, ABC receives $70 
       cash and an installment note that provides for six 
       semiannual payments . . . Each payment equals the 
       sum of a notional principal amount multiplied by the 
       London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) at the start of 
       the semiannual period.2 ABC uses the $70 cash and 
       the first payment on the installment note to liquidate 
       A's interest in ABC and uses the subsequent interest 
       payments to purchase long-term securities. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The proposal was premised on I.R.C. S 1212(a), which permits a 
taxpayer to carry back a capital loss to offset capital gains recognized 
within the preceding three years. 
 
2. The LIBOR [London Interbank Offering Rate] is the primary fixed 
income index reference rate used in [Europeanfinancial] markets. 
(Footnote is by Tax Court.) 
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73 T.C.M. at 2191. 
 
The law firm advised that the sale of the short-term 
securities would be reported as a contingent installment 
sale under the installment method which governs 
"dispositions[s] of property where at least 1 payment is to 
be received after the close of the taxable year in which the 
disposition occurs," I.R.C. S 453, and the ratable basis 
recovery rule which provides that, 
 
       [w]hen a stated maximum selling price cannot be 
       determined as of the close of the taxable year in which 
       the sale or other disposition occurs, but the maximum 
       period over which payments may be received under the 
       contingent sale price agreement is fixed, the taxpayer's 
       basis (inclusive of selling expenses) shall be allocated 
       to the taxable years in which payment may be received 
       under the agreement in equal annual increments. 
 
Temp. Treas. Reg. S 15a.453-1(c)(3)(i).3 Thus, the law firm 
advised, ABC would recover $25 of its basis in each of the 
4 taxable years from 1989 through 1992, and ABC would 
recognize gain to the extent that the payments received in 
any year exceeded the $25 or loss to the extent that the 
payments fell below the $25, but only if the loss were 
carried over to a year with sufficient reported gains against 
which to offset that loss. See 73 T.C.M. at 2191. 
 
On July 18, Pohlschroeder and Taylor, who had 
presented Merrill Lynch's proposal to Pohlschroeder's 
colleagues in Colgate's treasury department, discussed 
Colgate's concerns about the proposed partnership 
transaction, including its costs and its potential to serve 
Colgate's business purposes. Pohlschroeder's handwritten 
notes of the conversation read as follows: 
 
       . . . 
       Based on bus. purpose 
       Economic profit 
       Is this partnership profitable? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. All citations to the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations 
with respect to both this case and the cases we cite are to the versions 
in effect at the time of the relevant transactions. 
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       Every single step to be substantiated 
       invest in your own debt 
       Consolidation of effective control but not majority 
       ownership. 
 
App. at 634, 791. 
 
Colgate was interested in the concept of using the 
proposed partnership to invest in its own debt because of 
recent developments which had weighted Colgate's debt 
portfolio toward fixed-rate long-term debt, leaving Colgate 
vulnerable to a decline in interest rates.4 Moreover, 
persistent rumors that Colgate was a likely target for a 
hostile takeover or leveraged buyout had decreased the 
value of Colgate's debt issues due to the risk that Colgate's 
credit rating would be downgraded if Colgate became more 
highly leveraged. Because of these factors, Colgate 
perceived an opportunity to rebalance its debt profile, thus 
decreasing its exposure to falling interest rates, by 
acquiring its long-term debt issues at their presently 
discounted prices. See app. at 666-68, 880-82, 2762-63, 
2765, 2769-70; 73 T.C.M. at 2192. 
 
Colgate and Merrill Lynch discussed the possibility of 
using the proposed partnership to achieve these objectives. 
The acquisition of its own debt issues would decrease 
Colgate's exposure to falling interest rates because by 
acquiring those debt issues as an asset, Colgate effectively 
would reap the benefits of receiving the above-market 
interest payments due on those issues, thus hedging 
against the burdens associated with owing those payments. 
See 73 T.C.M. at 2193. Acquiring the debt through the 
partnership instead of directly would keep the acquisitions 
off Colgate's books, thus permitting Colgate to carry out its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 4. The elevated proportion of long-term debt in Colgate's debt structure 
arose in part from Colgate's use of the proceeds from the Kendall sale to 
retire significant amounts of short-term debt and its issuance of long- 
term debt to finance an employee retirement plan. See 73 T.C.M. at 
2192; app. at 77-78, 669-70, 2761, 2764-70. This high proportion of 
long-term fixed-rate debt exposed Colgate to risk in the event of 
declining 
interest rates, as Colgate would receive diminished returns from its cash 
balances and short-term deposits, but would continue to owe interest on 
its debts at the higher fixed rate. 
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debt acquisition strategy without alerting potential 
acquirors to the internal accumulation of debt issues 
which, by increasing the capacity for internal leverage, 
would increase Colgate's vulnerability to a hostile takeover 
bid. See 73 T.C.M. at 2192-93; app. at 101, 3249-50, 1921- 
26, 2793-99, 2810, 2819-20, 3255-61. Thus, the 
acquisition of Colgate debt through the partnership would 
allow Colgate to use partnership capital to acquire its debt 
issues immediately at advantageous prices, then to retire 
and reissue the debt when market conditions were more 
favorable. In the interim, the debt effectively would be 
retired because Colgate would not owe the obligations 
thereon to third parties, yet the debt would remain 
outstanding for accounting purposes, reducing Colgate's 
vulnerability to potential acquirors. See app. at 673; 73 
T.C.M. at 2193. 
 
On July 28, 1989, Merrill Lynch presented a proposed 
partnership transaction summary which incorporated 
Colgate's debt acquisition objectives into the tax reduction 
proposal involving the contingent installment sale which 
Merrill Lynch had presented to Colgate in May 1989. See 
app. at 678-79. Merrill Lynch revised its proposals 
throughout the summer and approached ABN about 
participating in the partnership with Colgate and Merrill 
Lynch. Merrill Lynch explained to ABN that the partnership 
would invest in Colgate long-term debt to serve Colgate's 
debt management objectives, would engage in a contingent 
installment sale, and would require ABN's participation for 
no more than 2-3 years. ABN agreed to meet with Colgate 
representatives in the middle of October 1989. See 73 
T.C.M. at 2193-94.5 
 
In a document dated August 17, 1989, Merrill Lynch set 
forth revisions to the planned partnership transactions 
which it had presented to Colgate on July 28, 1989. See 
app. at 275-77. This document, entitled "Revised 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 5. ABN was familiar with its role in the proposed transaction, as Merrill 
Lynch had approached ABN in early 1989 while it was developing the 
proposal and had sought ABN's participation in a similar partnership 
arranged on behalf of another Merrill Lynch client. See 73 T.C.M. at 
2194; app. at 1670-75, 1103. 
 
                                7 
 
 
 
Partnership Transaction Summary," see app. at 263-67, set 
forth the following proposal incorporating both the 
contingent installment sales transaction which Merrill 
Lynch initially had proposed in May 1989 and the debt 
acquisitions which Merrill Lynch had incorporated in its 
July 28 proposal:6 
 
       1) A Colgate subsidiary contributes $30 million, A BN 
       contributes $169.3 million and Merrill Lynch 
       contributes $.7 million. 
 
       2) The partnership invests its entire $200 million 
       capitalization in short-term, floating rate private 
       placement securities as "Interim Investments prior to 
       the acquisition of [Colgate] debt" which are to "earn a 
       return greater than comparably rated commercial 
       paper or bank deposits." 
 
       3) The partnership sells the short-term notes for a 
       combination of cash and LIBOR-based notes and uses 
       the cash to acquire Colgate debt. "The purpose of the 
       LIBOR notes will be to partly hedge the interest rate 
       sensitivity of long-term [Colgate] debt acquired by the 
       Partnership." 
 
       4) The partnership exchanges a portion of the long - 
       term Colgate debt for newly issued medium-term 
       Colgate debt, pursuant to a provision which affords 
       Colgate the option of making such exchanges through 
       the partnership. 
 
       5) The partnership adjusts its LIBOR note holdings. If 
       the partnership retains a substantial amount of long- 
       term debt, the Partnership "would likely . . . acquire 
       additional LIBOR-based assets or . . . other hedges to 
       reduce interest rate sensitivity of Partnership assets. 
       Alternatively, if a substantial amount of long-term 
       [Colgate] debt is exchanged, the Partnership would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The August 17 transaction summary referred to Colgate as "XYZ 
corporation," ABN as "Partner A," and Merrill Lynch as "Partner B." 
However, the identity of the parties is clear from the role that each of 
them played in the ensuing transactions and from Pohlschroeder's 
testimony. See app. at 685. Except where there are direct quotations we 
have paraphrased the summary. 
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       likely reduce its holding of LIBOR notes. Such a 
       reduction would be necessary because the Medium- 
       Term Debt, received in exchange for long-term [Colgate] 
       debt, is less interest rate sensitive than the long-term 
       [Colgate] debt. LIBOR Notes may either be sold directly 
       or distributed to one or more Partners in a non- 
       liquidating distribution." 
 
       6) If the partnership has not invested all of its capital 
       in Colgate debt and LIBOR instruments, the 
       partnership "may liquidate some or all of the remaining 
       Short-Term Notes and distribute the proceeds to one or 
       more of the partners."7 
 
       7) "Possible redemption of [ABN's] Partne rship interest. 
       Commencing one year after formation of the 
       Partnership, [ABN] has the right to have its Partnership 
       interest redeemed by the Partnership . . . . The 
       Partnership may redeem [ABN] in kind with 
       Partnership property of its choosing or in cash. For 
       example, assuming no change in asset values, the 
       Partnership could borrow $169.3 million collateralized 
       by its assets and use the proceeds to redeem [ABN]." 
 
       8) "If [ABN] is redeemed, the Partnership  must be 
       consolidated with [Colgate] for financial reporting 
       purposes. Accordingly, all assets, including [Colgate] 
       debt . . . will appear on the [Colgate] consolidated 
       balance sheet. The [Colgate] debt will be effectively 
       retired at that time. . . . [I]f the [Colgate] debt were 
       acquired at a premium or a discount, [Colgate] would 
       recognize a loss or gain, respectively, for income 
       statement purposes. It would be most reasonable for 
       the Partnership to sell the LIBOR Note . . . if[ABN] is 
       redeemed. Since the principal asset of the Partnership, 
       other than LIBOR Notes . . . is likely to be [Colgate] 
       debt and [Colgate] would be a 98% partner, the hedge 
       protection provided by the LIBOR Notes . . . is no 
       longer necessary." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This item was designated "Step 7." "Step 6" addressed a possible 
investment in Colgate receivables as an alternative to the LIBOR notes. 
Because ACM did not invest in Colgate receivables, this aspect of the 
proposal is immaterial. 
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       9) "After a period of years it might be advanta geous for 
       [Colgate] affiliates to purchase [Merrill Lynch's] 
       Partnership interest. Alternatively, the Partnership 
       might be liquidated with [Colgate] receiving[Colgate] 
       debt as proceeds of the liquidation." 
 
App. at 275-77. The final page of that document addressed 
the tax considerations of the arrangement and stated, 
 
       the liquidation of $200 million of Short-Term Notes in 
       exchange for approximately $140 million of cash and 
       $60 million market value of LIBOR notes should result 
       in approximately $106 million of gain to the 
       Partnership. 15% of such gain, $16 million, will be 
       allocable to [Colgate]. If . . . LIBOR notes are 
       distributed to [Colgate], each $10 million market value 
       of the LIBOR notes distributed should have a tax basis 
       of approximately $28 million. In a succeeding tax year, 
       the Partnership will recognize a loss on sale or at 
       maturity of the remaining LIBOR Notes. 98% of such 
       loss will be allocable to [Colgate] because[Colgate] will 
       be a 98% partner at such time. Combined, losses on 
       sale of LIBOR Notes distributed to [Colgate] and losses 
       on sale of LIBOR Notes by the Partnership should 
       exceed $106 million. Accordingly, [Colgate] should 
       recognize a net loss of approximately $90 million. After 
       discounting and transactions costs . . . the transaction 
       produces over $20 million present value benefits to 
       [Colgate]. 
 
App. at 279. 
 
A representative of ABN's legal department testified that 
the partnership, as he understood it, was to: 
 
       enter into transactions that would create a capital gain 
       and in a later stage a capital loss, and that . . . 
       depending on the percentage of your participation, you 
       would either take part in the gain or the loss. So by 
       having us being the majority partner at the start, we 
       would take the majority of the gain, while in a later 
       stage one of the other partners would take the loss. 
 
App. at 1298. 
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In a memorandum dated October 3, 1989, Pohlschroeder 
recommended the partnership to Colgate Treasurer Brian 
Heidtke. See App. at 310-21. Pohlschroeder outlined the 
advantages of repurchasing outstanding Colgate debt 
through a partnership, and stated that "[t]he partnership 
would temporarily invest the funds in some short-term 
instruments and, at the same time, start the repurchasing 
program." App. at 312. The memorandum identified three 
sets of Colgate debt issues targeted for repurchase: 1) a set 
of 9.625% 30-year notes due in 2017 ("Long Bonds"); 2) a 
set of Eurodollar debentures due in 1996 ("Euro notes"); 
and 3) a set of 8.4% private placement notes held by 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") and 
due in 1998 ("Met Notes"). The memorandum stated that 
"pursuant to an inquiry to Metropolitan, we feel confident 
that the partnership can purchase sufficient Colgate debt" 
to carry out the proposed plan. App. at 313-14.8 
 
The memorandum's "Interest Rate Outlook" predicted 
that although the Federal Reserve Bank was not expected 
to "quickly lower interest rates in the near future," it was 
expected to "reduce the . . . rate" by late 1989 or early 1990 
to a level that would allow Colgate to "lock in attractive 
medium term interest rates." App. at 311. The 
memorandum then analyzed the impact of a one to two 
percent interest rate increase or decrease on the LIBOR 
notes and the Colgate debt issues that the partnership 
expected to acquire. According to the analysis, a given 
decrease in interest rates would increase the value of the 
long-term Colgate debt and decrease the value of the LIBOR 
notes in roughly equal and offsetting amounts because the 
value of the LIBOR notes was directly dependent on interest 
rates whereas the value of the fixed-rate debt issues was 
inversely proportional to interest rates. See  app. at 951-52, 
313. Thus, the memorandum concluded, "the LIBOR note is 
an effective hedge of fixed rate assets for the partnership." 
App. at 313. The memorandum stated that it would be 
necessary to establish a "Desired Hedge Ratio" of LIBOR 
holdings to long-term debt holdings, so that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Pohlschroder testified that as of August 1989, he had received calls 
from traders indicating that the Long Bonds also were potentially 
available for purchase. See app. at 688. 
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partnership's assets would be "fully hedged" against 
changes in value due to interest rate fluctuations. App. at 
314. 
 
The memorandum recommended that Colgate proceed 
with the partnership as a means "to actively manage its 
liability structure," and stated that the "Next Steps" after 
executing a partnership agreement, establishing the 
partnership in a "Foreign Jurisdiction" and funding the 
partnership were the following: 
 
       -Short-term investment securities acquired. 
 
       - . . . . Disposition of short-term investment securities 
       to fund acquisition of Colgate debt. 
 
App. at 321. 
 
In a document marked "REVISED 9/1/89," Merrill Lynch 
provided Colgate a "Cost Component Analysis," which 
estimated after-tax costs associated with the proposed 
acquisition and disposition of short-term notes and 
acquisition of LIBOR notes. Merrill Lynch estimated that 
the short-term notes would entail an "origination" cost of 
$1.32 million, while the "remarketing" of the LIBOR notes 
would cost $1.29 million in addition to $.17 million in legal 
expenses and $1.32 million in Merrill Lynch advisory fees. 
See app. at 294. 
 
A September 20, 1989 document delineated the details of 
the proposed partnership transactions and their anticipated 
tax consequences under I.R.C. S 453 and the ratable basis 
recovery rule, Temp. Treas. Reg. S 15a.453. See app. at 
296-308. The document contemplated using the 
partnership's $200 million in cash investments to acquire 
short-term notes, see app. at 303, disposing of the short- 
term notes in exchange for $140 million in cash and LIBOR 
instruments which would generate contingent payments 
with a present value of $60 million, and using the $140 
million in cash to purchase Colgate debt. App. at 300-01, 
304-05. Because the partnership was to receive payments 
on the exchange over the course of six years, the $200 
million basis in the short-term notes was to be recovered 
ratably over six tax years in equal increments of $33.3 
million per year pursuant to S 15a.453. Thus, according to 
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this document, the transaction would result in significant 
capital gains in the first year, consisting of the $106.7 
million difference between the $140 million cash received 
that year and the $33.3 million basis recovered that year, 
and would result in capital losses in each of the ensuing 
years because the contingent payments received in each of 
those years considering imputed interest would fall short of 
the $33.3 million basis to be recovered in each of those 
years. See app. at 301. The aggregate projected capital 
losses in the ensuing years equaled precisely the amount of 
capital gains reported in the first year, and the document 
stated that the recognition of those losses "may be 
accelerated in any year subsequent to 1989 by sale of the 
remaining LIBOR notes." App. at 301. 
 
The document also contemplates Colgate's increasing its 
share in the partnership from 15% to 97% after the 
partnership recognized the $106.7 million capital gain in 
year 1 but before it recognized the capital losses in the 
ensuing years. See app. at 305-08. According to the 
document, the LIBOR notes eventually would be sold for a 
capital loss of $80 million, 97% of which would be allocated 
to Colgate based on its 97% partnership interest by the 
time the loss was incurred. See app. at 304, 308-09. 
 
At an October 12, 1989 meeting of Colgate's Board of 
Directors, the Directors considered the proposal and stated 
that it: 
 
       had originally been presented . . . with a view toward 
       minimizing the capital gains tax arising out of the 
       disposition of the Kendall business. However, major 
       changes were made . . . so that the program would 
       provide the important business advantages of 
       accumulating [Colgate] debt in friendly hands and 
       permitting [Colgate] to obtain flexibility in managing 
       the ratio balance between short and long term debt 
       and the resulting interest exposure. Without these 
       treasury advantages, management would not have 
       recommended this transaction. 
 
       . . . . Over the life of the partnership, significant tax 
       benefits should be generated for Colgate, but even 
       without these benefits, Colgate would earn a pre-tax 
       return of approximately 6% on its investment. 
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App. at 337. According to Steven Belasco, Colgate's Vice 
President of Taxation, the incorporation of Colgate's debt 
acquisition objectives into Merrill Lynch's initial proposal 
afforded sufficient business advantages to overcome 
Colgate's hesitations about Merrill Lynch's initial proposal 
which served only the tax objectives of generating a capital 
loss to offset 1988 capital gains. See app. at 1235-36. 
 
B. The Partnership 
 
In late September and early October 1989, as Colgate 
was contemplating final approval of its participation in the 
proposed partnership, Merrill Lynch was finalizing 
arrangements for ABN's participation in the partnership. An 
ABN document dated October 11, 1989, stated that it 
would agree to enter the partnership on the conditions that: 
1) "[t]he timing of the purchases and sales of the various 
securities be adhered to as proposed;" 2) "Colgate's 
obligation to purchase Kannex's interest in the partnership 
. . . is unconditional;" and 3) Merrill Lynch agrees to 
repurchase the securities "at par on November 29, 1989." 
73 T.C.M. at 2197; app. at 1061, 1064-65.9  
 
Between October 24 and October 27, 1989, ABN 
established Kannex, Colgate established Southampton, and 
Merrill Lynch established MLCS to participate in the ACM 
partnership. See 73 T.C.M. at 2197; app. at 81-84, 89-91. 
The October 27, 1989 partnership agreement among these 
newly created entities provided that Kannex was to receive 
a preferred return of the first $1.24 million in any 
partnership profits otherwise allocable to Southampton. See 
app. at 101; 73 T.C.M. at 2198-99.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The document referred to the securities as "MTNs" or medium-term 
notes. However, it is apparent from the November 29, 1989 date by 
which those notes were to be resold that these were the same securities 
which the partnership was to purchase initially and dispose of shortly 
thereafter in exchange for cash which would be used to purchase Colgate 
debt and for LIBOR notes. See app. at 321, 300-05. 
 
10. This "preferred return" provision was a component of the proposed 
partnership from its inception. In a document dated September 1, 1989, 
Merrill Lynch advised Colgate that this aspect of the partnership would 
cost Colgate $740,000. See app. at 294. 
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On October 27, 1989, after executing the partnership 
agreement, the partners met and authorized Merrill Lynch 
to find willing sellers of Colgate debt issues, including the 
Euro Notes, Met Notes, and Long Bonds which had been 
identified in Pohlschroeder's October 3 memorandum. See 
app. at 313, 386. The partners resolved that "in order to 
maximize the investment return on its assets pending the 
acquisition" of these debt issues, Merrill Lynch was 
authorized "to arrange the purchase (in a private 
placement) of $205 million of . . . unsecured debt." App. at 
386-87. 
 
The minutes of the partnership meeting reported that 
Colgate's treasury department had contacted Metropolitan 
with a proposal to purchase $100,000,000 of the Met notes, 
and that Metropolitan "if interested, would come to 
Bermuda on November 17, 1989 in order to negotiate and 
make final such transaction." App. at 387. 11 Earlier in the 
fall of 1989, Pohlschroeder had initiated discussions with 
Metropolitan about selling the notes after Metropolitan 
contacted him to express concern about certain terms in 
the notes. See app. 690-91, 742. Before the November 17 
meeting, a Metropolitan representative left Pohlschroeder a 
message indicating the price at which Metropolitan was 
prepared to sell the Met notes. Pohlschroeder did not 
respond to the call. See 73 T.C.M. at 2200; app. at 883. 
Pohlschroeder previously had conferred with Merrill Lynch's 
Henry Yordan about acquiring the Met Notes, Euro Notes, 
and Long Bonds. See app. at 117-18; 73 T.C.M. at 2200. 
Pohlschroeder's handwritten memorandum of the 
conversations regarding the Met notes concludes with a 
notation of the date November 17, while his notations 
regarding the acquisition of the Long Bonds and Euro Notes 
state that Kannex would instruct Merrill Lynch after 
purchase of Citicorp notes which, as discussed below, were 
to serve as the initial short-term investment contemplated 
in the partnership proposals. 73 T.C.M. at 2200; app. at 
880; 889-90. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Pohlschroeder had contacted Metropolitan shortly after the first 
partnership meeting in October 1989 and had instructed Metropolitan to 
send a representative to the November 17 meeting if Metropolitan was 
interested in selling the Met notes. See app. at 743. 
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C. The Transactions 
 
On November 2, 1989, Kannex contributed $169.4 
million, Southampton contributed $35 million, and MLCS 
contributed $0.6 million to the newly created ACM 
partnership for a total partnership capitalization of $205 
million. See app. at 98. Based on these contributions, 
Kannex held an 82.6% share of the partnership, 
Southampton held a 17.1% share, and MLCS held a 0.3% 
share. 73 T.C.M. at 2197; app. at 98. ACM deposited the 
$205 million in an account at ABN's New York branch 
paying interest at an annual rate of 8.75%. ACM withdrew 
the funds the following day and purchased ten private 
placement Citicorp notes in an aggregate amount of $205 
million. The Citicorp notes paid interest monthly at a 
floating rate that was to be reset monthly. The initial rate 
was 8.78%, three basis points above the rate the funds 
were earning in the ABN account.12 On November 15, 1989, 
Citicorp made an interest payment and reset the interest 
rate to 8.65%. 73 T.C.M. at 2200. 
 
In late October 1989, before ACM's November 3 
acquisition of the Citicorp notes, Merrill Lynch had 
approached Bank of Tokyo ("BOT") and Banque Francaise 
du Commerce Exterieure ("BFCE") to negotiate selling them 
those notes.13 During the first week of November, Merrill 
Lynch forwarded BOT and BFCE specific terms of the 
proposed sale in which those two banks would purchase an 
aggregate of $175 million of the notes for $140 million in 
cash plus LIBOR notes providing for a five-year stream of 
quarterly payments with a net present value of 
approximately $35 million. See 73 T.C.M. at 2200; app. at 
107-08.14 On November 9, 1989, BOT representatives 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. A basis point, a common unit of measure for interest rates, equals 
one one-hundredth of a percent. 
 
13. Pohlschroeder testified that ACM expected to sell the Citicorp notes 
for cash and LIBOR notes within several weeks to make the cash 
available to purchase Colgate debt. App. at 739-40. Pohlschroeder also 
stated that the Citicorp exchange was designed "to accomplish a tax 
aspect of the transaction." App. at 740. 
 
14. In negotiating the transactions with BOT and BFCE, Merrill Lynch 
also agreed to arrange a series of swaps which would hedge the banks' 
interest rate risks and provide them additional return on their purchase 
of the Citicorp notes. See 73 T.C.M. at 2206-10. 
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requested approval from their head office, attaching 
documents which set forth "all details of the transaction." 
On November 10, 1989, Merrill Lynch confirmed that it 
would sell $125 million in Citicorp notes to BOT and $50 
million to BFCE. See app. at 111-14; 73 T.C.M. at 2200. 
 
On November 17, 1989, ACM convened its second 
partnership meeting in Bermuda. A Metropolitan 
representative attended pursuant to Pohlschroeder's 
invitation to attend if interested in selling the Met Notes. 
After brief negotiations, ACM and Metropolitan agreed that 
ACM would purchase $100 million principal amount of Met 
Notes effective December 4, 1989. App. at 118-19, 390; 73 
T.C.M. at 2201. Pohlschroeder stated that ACM would need 
to raise cash by the time of the December 4 purchase and 
that the acquisition of long-term fixed-rate debt"would 
create a risk to the partnership in the event that interest 
rates increased." Accordingly, he recommended that ACM 
"hedge its risk by purchasing notional principal contracts 
with a floating rate of interest." App. at 391. ACM thus 
resolved "to arrange the sale of $175 million principal 
amount of Citicorp Notes" to BOT and BFCE "for cash and 
other LIBOR-based consideration, upon substantially the 
terms of a draft Installment Purchase Agreement presented 
to the meeting . . . in order to pay Metropolitan the 
amounts to be due . . . and to hedge . . . exposure to 
interest rate changes." App. at 391. 
 
ACM completed the sale of the Citicorp notes on 
November 27, 1989, in accordance with the terms which 
Merrill Lynch had negotiated by November 10 and which 
ACM had approved on November 17, selling $125 million of 
the notes to BOT and $50 million of them to BFCE for a 
total of $140 million in cash and eight LIBOR notes issued 
by BOT and BFCE. The LIBOR notes provided for a stream 
of 20 quarterly contingent payments commencing on March 
1, 1990, whose amount was derived from the three-month 
LIBOR multiplied by a notional principal amount of $97.76 
million.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The notional principal amount did not represent an amount owed, 
but rather was designated as a multiplier to determine the amount of the 
LIBOR-based contingent payments. 
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In exchange for the $175,000,000 Citicorp notes, ACM 
received consideration totaling $174,410,814, which 
represented the $175,000,000 value of the Citicorp notes, 
reduced by the $1,093,750 in transaction costs for 
arranging the sale of these illiquid private placement 
instruments, but increased by the $504,564 in interest that 
had accrued on the Citicorp notes during the 12 days since 
their last interest payment on November 15. Accordingly, 
the LIBOR notes effectively cost ACM $35,504,564, the 
difference between the $175,504,564 in value which ACM 
relinquished and the $140,000,000 in cash which ACM 
received in return, but had a present value of $34,410,814 
to reflect the $1,093,750 in transaction costs. See 73 
T.C.M. 2201 02, 2206-10; app. at 751. The LIBOR notes 
issued by BOT accounted for $25,360,403 of the aggregate 
cost and $24,579,153 of the aggregate present value, while 
those issued by BFCE accounted for $10,144,161 of the 
aggregate cost and $9,831,661 of the aggregate present 
value of the LIBOR notes acquired in the exchange. See 73 
T.C.M. at 2201. 
 
Upon selling the Citicorp notes on November 27, ACM 
invested the $140 million in cash proceeds in time deposits 
and certificates of deposit due seven days later on 
December 4, 1989, and bearing interest at 8.15% to 8.20%. 
In several transactions between December 4 and 8, ACM 
purchased Colgate debt including $100 million of the Met 
Notes pursuant to the November 17 agreement, $5 million 
of the Euro Notes, and $31 million of the Long Bonds. See 
app. at 118-20. ACM purchased an additional $18.75 
million in Colgate long-term debt issues between June and 
October 1990. See 73 T.C.M. at 2205; app. at 119-20, 122- 
23. 
 
During the weeks preceding ACM's November 27 
acquisition of the LIBOR notes, Merrill Lynch began 
arranging to sell a portion of them. In a November 13, 1989 
memorandum entitled "Analysis of Partnership Hedging 
Activity," Merrill Lynch stated that certain events would 
warrant a reduction in the desired amount of LIBOR 
holdings. Specifically, Merrill Lynch explained that if 
Southampton elected to increase its share of the 
partnership's interest rate risk, as it was entitled to do 
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under a provision of the partnership agreement, see app. at 
101; 73 T.C.M. at 2198-99, or if ACM exchanged the Long 
Bonds for a new issue of five-year Colgate debt, ACM 
should reduce its LIBOR note holdings in light of its 
diminished need for their hedging function. See 73 T.C.M. 
at 2202. Merrill Lynch approached a major Danish bank, 
Sparekassen SDS ("Sparekassen"), offering it the BFCE 
LIBOR notes which totaled approximately $10 million, 
along with collateral swaps which provided Sparekassen 
risk protection and a return on its investment. On 
December 5, 1989, Sparekassen set aside a $10 million 
credit line in preparation for the transaction. See 73 T.C.M. 
at 2202. 
 
At ACM's third partnership meeting on December 12, 
1989, Southampton elected to increase its share of ACM's 
interest rate exposure and ACM exchanged a portion of the 
Long Bonds for shorter-term debt issues pursuant to"the 
terms of a Note Purchase Agreement presented to the 
meeting." See app. at 101, 396-97; 73 T.C.M. at 2205. 
Merrill Lynch advised that ACM decrease its LIBOR note 
holdings in light of these factors reducing its interest rate 
exposure. App. at 397. ACM resolved to distribute the 
BFCE LIBOR notes to Southampton as a return of 
contributed capital, and executed Assignment Agreements 
conveying those notes to Southampton. See app. at 124, 
398. 
 
On December 22, 1989, Southampton sold the BFCE 
notes to Sparekassen for aggregate consideration of 
$9,406,180, an amount $425,481 below the $9,831,661 
present value of the notes when ACM acquired them on 
November 27. See app. at 125-26; 73 T.C.M. at 2201, 
2202-03 & n.10. Of this discrepancy, $390,000 resulted 
from the transaction costs and bid-ask spread necessary to 
market the LIBOR notes, while the remaining shortfall 
resulted from the decreased value of the notes due to the 
decline in interest rates since November 27 and from a 
quarterly payment on the notes which reduced their 
remaining value. See 73 T.C.M. at 2202; app. at 1560-61, 
1628. 
 
On June 25, 1991, Colgate acquired a 38.31% share in 
ACM from Kannex for $85,897,203.60 and Southampton 
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acquired an additional 6.69% share from Kannex for 
$15,000,000, giving Colgate-Southampton a majority 
interest in ACM. App. at 131-32, 414. Because it had 
acquired a majority interest in ACM, Colgate consolidated 
ACM's holdings with its own on its books, revealing its 
control of the debt issues which theretofore had remained 
outstanding on its books. See app. at 3249-50. ACM 
retained $30 million in Citicorp notes until October 16, 
1991, when it put them to Citicorp at par pursuant to an 
option provision. ACM earned $4,329,191 of interest on the 
portion of the Citicorp notes which it held until 1991. See 
app. at 507-67, 570-98. 
 
On November 27, 1991, ACM redeemed Kannex's 
remaining partnership interest for $100,775,915, leaving 
Colgate and Southampton with a combined 99.7% interest 
in ACM. App. at 137-38. At a December 5, 1991 
partnership meeting, Merrill Lynch stated that because 
Colgate owned virtually the entire partnership, its"net 
economic exposure to the risk of interest rate fluctuations 
in the value of the Colgate debt was effectively minimal, and 
the Partnership need not maintain its position in the 
[LIBOR notes] to hedge against such exposure." App. at 
408. Thus, Merrill Lynch explained, without the need for 
hedging, it was "unwise for the Partnership to hold" this 
"highly volatile investment" given the market's declining 
interest rates. ACM resolved to sell its remaining LIBOR 
notes, which were those issued by BOT, the BFCE LIBOR 
notes having been distributed to Southampton and 
subsequently sold to Sparekassen. App. at 409. On 
December 17, 1991, ACM sold the BOT LIBOR notes to 
BFCE for $10,961,581, a price that reflected a significant 
loss in value due to declining interest rates which had 
reduced the three-month LIBOR from 8.5% to 5.7% and 
transaction costs of $440,000 arising from the bid-ask 
spread needed to remarket the notes. See 73 T.C.M. at 
2206; app. at 138. 
 
D. Tax and Financial Accounting of the Transactions 
 
On its partnership return for the tax year ended 
November 30, 1989, ACM treated the November 27, 1989 
exchange of the Citicorp notes as an installment sale under 
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I.R.C. S 453, as ACM was to receive part of the 
consideration for that exchange "after the close of the 
taxable year in which the disposition occurs" pursuant to 
S 453(b)(1). App. at 109. Because the quarterly LIBOR note 
payments would vary based on fluctuations in the LIBOR, 
there was no "stated maximum selling price" that could be 
identified "as of the close of the taxable year in which the 
. . . . disposition occurs." Thus, the transaction came within 
the terms of Temp. Treas. Reg. S 15a.453-1(c), whose 
ratable basis recovery rule provides that the taxpayer's 
basis "shall be allocated to the taxable years in which 
payment may be received under the agreement in equal 
annual increments." 
 
Accordingly, ACM divided its $175,504,564 basis in the 
Citicorp notes, consisting of their $175 million purchase 
price and $504,564 of accrued payable interest, equally 
among the six years over which payments were to be 
received in exchange for those notes, and thus recovered 
one sixth of that basis, or $29,250,761, during 1989.16 
Subtracting this basis from the $140 million in cash 
consideration for the Citicorp notes, ACM reported a 1989 
capital gain of $110,749,239.42 which it allocated among 
its partners according to their partnership shares, resulting 
in an allocation of $91,516,689 of the gain to Kannex, 
$18,908,407 to Southampton, and $324,144 to MLCS. See 
app. at 109, 144-66; 73 T.C.M. at 2203. Southampton and 
MLCS were subject to United States income tax on their 
respective shares of the gain, but Kannex as a foreign 
corporation was not. App. at 226-35.17  
 
Under the ratable basis recovery rule the tax basis 
remaining to be recovered over the following five years 
became $146,253,803, representing the difference between 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. ACM divided the basis across six years instead of five, although the 
LIBOR payments were to be received over 20 quarters commencing in 
1990, because it received the cash portion of the consideration three 
days before the end of the 1989 tax year, making 1989 a year "in which 
payment may be received" under S 15a.453. 
 
17. According to the Tax Court the share allocated to Kannex was not 
taxed in any jurisdiction but we, of course, are focusing only on the 
United States tax aspects of the transaction. 
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the $175,504,564 value of the Citicorp notes which ACM 
relinquished to acquire those notes and the $29,250,761 in 
basis recovered during the first year of the transaction. See 
app. at 110. Of the $146,253,803 reported as the remaining 
unrecovered tax basis after 1989, $41,786,801 was 
attributable to the BFCE LIBOR notes, whose actual cost 
was $10,144,161, while $104,467,002 was attributable to 
the BOT LIBOR notes, whose actual cost was $25,360,403. 
See 73 T.C.M. at 2201, 2203 & n.11. 
 
On its 1989 tax return, Southampton reported its 
$18,908,407 share of the capital gain from the 
$140,000,000 cash received in exchange for the Citicorp 
notes, and reported a $32,429,839 capital loss from its 
December 22, 1989 sale to Sparekassen of the BFCE LIBOR 
notes which it had received in the December 12, 1989 
distribution from ACM.18 Because these capital losses 
completely offset the capital gains, Southampton reported a 
net 1989 capital loss of $13,521,432 and did not report any 
net tax liability on its share of ACM's gain from the 
disposition of the Citicorp notes. See 73 T.C.M. at 2203. 
 
ACM retained the Curacao office of Arthur Andersen & 
Co. as its accountants. In reviewing ACM's financial and 
tax accounting for 1989, the Arthur Andersen auditors 
noted that ACM's records were inconsistent in their 
treatment of the $1,093,750 spread between the amount of 
consideration ACM had paid for the LIBOR notes and their 
market value at the time of acquisition. Specifically, the 
auditors noted, ACM had not accounted for this transaction 
cost in its income statement, but had included it in the 
book value of the LIBOR notes contrary to a provision in 
the partnership agreement requiring that assets be 
recorded at fair market value. Due to this discrepancy, 
ACM's records effectively overstated the market value of the 
LIBOR notes and understated the transaction costs 
involved in acquiring them through the contingent 
installment sale. See 73 T.C.M. at 2204. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. This $32,429,839 loss was computed based upon the $9,406,180 
cash proceeds from the sale, minus the $41,786,601 tax basis in the 
notes, minus $48,693 in accrued interest payable on the notes. See 73 
T.C.M. at 2203. 
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The audit manager wrote the following memorandum in 
February 1990 to his colleagues regarding the discrepancy: 
 
       Colgate does not want the cost to sell [the Citicorp 
       notes] of US $1,093,750 . . . in the . . . income 
       statement of ACM. The reasons are mainly tax driven, 
       as inclusion might set the IRS on top of the reasons 
       why the partnership was constructed in the first place 
       and thus the planned tax losses might be denied by 
       the IRS. We . . . were requested to think with Colgate 
       in order to keep the cost to sell out of the balance 
       sheet. 
 
Id.; see also app. at 141. Arthur Andersen proposed that to 
avoid accounting for the costs associated with the LIBOR 
notes, ACM could continue to record the transaction costs 
as part of the value of the LIBOR notes and could resolve 
the conflict with the market valuation provision of the 
partnership agreement by issuing "a side letter to the 
partnership agreement stating that the LIBOR notes are the 
one exception to the valuation rules which now state 
valuation at market and would . . . then state valuation at 
market increased by the cost to sell the original Citicorp 
notes." Id. 
 
At its February 28, 1990 partnership meeting, ACM 
adopted this approach and enacted special valuation rules 
which provided that the LIBOR notes, unlike other 
partnership assets, would be valued on ACM's books "at 
cost" rather than at market value and would be adjusted 
upon distribution of the note to a partner, redemption of 
the partnership interest of any partner, or liquidation of the 
partnership. See app. at 402, 407.19 This provision 
effectively transferred the transaction costs associated with 
exchanging the Citicorp notes for LIBOR notes to the 
partner that eventually received the notes in a distribution, 
as the market value would be less than the reported value 
of the distribution. See 73 T.C.M. at 2204. Thus, ACM's 
December 12, 1989 distribution of the BFCE LIBOR notes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The rules described the LIBOR notes as the "[c]ontingent payment 
notes with no stated principal value, with payments resulting from the 
product of a notional amount and a floating rate of interest." App. at 
407. 
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effectively passed those transaction costs to Southampton 
in accordance with the partners' understanding that 
Colgate and Southampton would bear the transaction costs 
associated with trading private placement notes. See app. 
at 1622-25. 
 For its tax year ended December 31, 1991, ACM reported 
a capital loss of $84,997,111 from its December 17, 1991 
sale of the BOT LIBOR notes.20 This loss consisted of the 
difference between the $10,961,581 that ACM received for 
those notes and the remaining $95,958,692 basis in those 
notes. App. at 202-25. Of this amount of loss, $5.8 million 
resulted from a decline in the value of the LIBOR notes due 
to declining interest rates while $79,106,599 resulted from 
the application of the ratable basis recovery rule which 
effectively added to the tax basis of the LIBOR notes 5/6 of 
the $140 million value of the Citicorp notes which had been 
exchanged for cash. See 73 T.C.M. at 2206. 21 Because 
Colgate, together with its subsidiary Southampton, by that 
time owned 99.7% of the partnership, Colgate claimed 
99.7% of the $84,997,111 capital loss on its 1991 return 
for a total capital loss of $84,537,479. App. at 247-51. 
Colgate then filed an amended 1988 return reporting this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. This appeal concerns adjustments to ACM's 1989 and 1991 tax 
returns. Although the Commissioner's Final Partnership Administrative 
Adjustment and the Tax Court's decision made adjustments to ACM's 
1990 tax return, these adjustments affected only the basis in certain 
assets with no effect on net tax liability for 1990. See app. at 3444. 
Thus, we do not discuss the 1990 return further. 
 
21. Had it not applied the ratable basis recovery rule, ACM would have 
subtracted from the consideration it received upon disposition of the 
BOT LIBOR notes only the remaining portion of the LIBOR notes' 
aggregate $35,504,564 actual cost basis rather than the remaining 
portion of their aggregate $175,504,564 tax basis which ACM derived by 
aggregating the $140 million cash portion of the Citicorp note 
transaction with the $35 million LIBOR note portion of the transaction 
and adjusting the aggregate basis for accrued interest, yielding 
$95,958,692 in unrecovered basis at the time of the disposition of the 
BOT LIBOR notes. ACM also treated a portion of the proceeds from the 
notes as interest income rather than capital gains. See 73 T.C.M. at 
2206; app. at 3388. 
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loss as a carryback pursuant to I.R.C. S 1212 to offset a 
portion of its 1988 capital gains. See app. at 252-62.22 
 
E. The Tax Court Decision 
 
On March 12, 1993, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue ("Commissioner") issued ACM a Notice of Final 
Partnership Administrative Adjustment ("FPAA") eliminating 
ACM's $110,749,239.42 installment gain from the sale of 
the Citicorp notes in November 1989, redetermining ACM's 
tax basis in the BFCE LIBOR notes distributed in December 
1989, and disallowing the $84,997,111 capital loss 
deduction which ACM reported in 1991. See app. at 28-42. 
In writing this opinion we primarily focus on the capital 
loss aspects of the case, though it should be understood 
that the gain and loss are part of a single integrated plan. 
The Commissioner asserted in the FPAA that the 
transactions involving the purchase and sale of the Citicorp 
notes in exchange for cash and LIBOR notes, "were shams 
in that they were prearranged and predetermined. . .. 
[S]aid transactions were devoid of economic substance 
necessary for recognition for federal income tax purposes 
and were totally lacking in economic reality. The 
transactions were created solely for tax motivated purposes 
without any realistic expectation of profit." App. at 39. On 
May 24, 1993, Southampton, in its capacity as ACM's tax 
matters partner, filed a petition in the Tax Court contesting 
the Commissioner's adjustments.23 ACM argued that its 
transactions 
 
       were bona fide arm's length transactions at fair market 
       value and had economic substance. . . . The purchase 
       of the Citicorp notes on November 3, 1989, and the 
       sale of a portion of the Citicorp notes on November 27, 
       1989, were not prearranged or predetermined, and 
       both had economic substance. . . . . The sale of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. This capital loss of $84,537,479, combined with Colgate's reported 
1989 net capital loss of $13,521,432, gave rise to total reported capital 
losses of $98,058,911 over the course of Colgate's participation in ACM's 
transactions. See 73 T.C.M. at 2206. 
 
23. A designated tax matters partner represents the partnership in 
proceedings before the Tax Court. See I.R.C. SS 6231(a)(7), 6226(a). 
 
                                25 
 
 
 
       Citicorp notes by ACM in exchange for fixed payments 
       and contingent payments under the LIBOR Notes 
       qualified for installment sale treatment under Treas. 
       Reg. S 15a.453-1(c)(3). 
 
App. at 25. 
 
The Tax Court tried the case over a month-long period in 
1996 and on March 5, 1997, issued a memorandum 
opinion upholding the Commissioner's adjustments on the 
grounds that "[a] taxpayer is not entitled to recognize a 
phantom loss from a transaction that lacks economic 
substance." 73 T.C.M. at 2215. In reaching the conclusion 
that ACM was not entitled to deduct its claimed capital 
losses, the court examined the stated purposes and 
anticipated economic consequences of the transaction, and 
found that the claimed losses were "not economically 
inherent in" the transactions but rather were"created 
artificially" by machinations whose only purpose and effect 
was to give rise to the desired tax consequences. Id. On 
April 4, 1997, ACM moved for reconsideration of the court's 
opinion, arguing that the transactions had sufficient 
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes. See 
app. at 3311-47. The court denied the motion on June 9, 
1997. See app. at 3439-41. 
 
The parties filed memoranda, pursuant to Tax Court Rule 
of Practice and Procedure 155, regarding the computation 
of tax liability in accordance with the Tax Court's 
memorandum opinion. See app. at 3385-444. ACM 
proposed a computation which disallowed deductions for 
the losses resulting from its application of the ratable basis 
recovery rule but which allowed the deduction of 
approximately $6,000,000 in actual economic losses 
resulting from the loss in value of the LIBOR notes. See 
app. at 3348-51, 3385-98. In a decision entered June 12, 
1997, the Tax Court rejected ACM's computations and 
eliminated the entire $84,997,111 capital loss reported in 
1991 as well as the 1989 capital gains reported in the first 
year of the Citicorp note transaction. See app. at 3444. 
ACM filed a timely notice of appeal on September 8, 1997. 
See app. at 39-40. The Commissioner filed a protective 
cross appeal seeking to preserve the right to proceed on 
alternate theories for sustaining the adjustments in the 
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event that the Tax Court's application of the economic 
substance doctrine were reversed. See app. at 3447.24 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Economic Substance and the Sham Transaction 
Doctrine 
 
We must decide whether the Tax Court erred in 
disallowing ACM's claimed $110,749,239.42 capital gain in 
1989 and its $84,997,111 capital loss which the court 
characterized as a "phantom loss from a transaction that 
lacks economic substance." 73 T.C.M. at 2215. While we 
conduct plenary review of the Tax Court's legal conclusions, 
we review its factual findings, including its ultimate finding 
as to the economic substance of a transaction, for clear 
error. See Fredericks v. Commissioner, 126 F.3d 433, 436 
(3d Cir. 1997); Harbor Bancorp v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 
722, 727 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1035 
(1998); Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 
115 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1997); Ferguson v. 
Commissioner, 29 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1994); Lukens v. 
Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1991); Karr v. 
Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 1991); Rice's 
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 92 (4th 
Cir. 1985).25 
 
ACM contends that, because its transactions on their 
face satisfied each requirement of the contingent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Inasmuch as we agree with the Tax Court's decision sustaining the 
adjustments based on the lack of economic substance behind the 
transactions, we, like the Tax Court, need not consider the 
Commissioner's alternate theories. See 73 T.C.M. at 2190. In view of the 
elimination of the 1989 gain the parties apparently were spared from 
applying the complex mitigation provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. 
See Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 54 (1996). 
 
25. We review findings of ultimate fact, like other findings of fact, only 
for 
clear error, contrary to our former practice of reviewing such findings de 
novo. See Geftman v. Commissioner, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 460172, No. 
97-7313, slip op. at 11 n.9 (3d Cir. Aug. 10, 1998); Pleasant Summit 
Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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installment sale provisions and regulations thereunder, it 
properly deducted the losses arising from its 
"straightforward application" of these provisions, which 
required it to recover only one sixth of the basis in the 
Citicorp notes during the first of the six years over which it 
was to receive payments. See Temp. Treas. Reg. S 15a.453- 
1(c).26 Thus, ACM contends, it properly subtracted the basis 
in the LIBOR notes to include the remaining five sixths of 
the basis in the Citicorp notes used to acquire them.27 
Consequently, ACM argues it properly subtracted the 
approximately $96 million remaining unrecovered basis in 
the BOT LIBOR notes from the approximately $11 million 
consideration it received upon disposition of those notes, 
see br. at 32; app. at 202-03, and correctly recognized and 
reported the gains and losses arising from its sale or 
exchange of property in accordance with I.R.C. S 1001. 
 
While ACM's transactions, at least in form, satisfied each 
requirement of the contingent installment sale provisions 
and ratable basis recovery rule,28 ACM acknowledges that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Although the LIBOR notes generated 20 quarterly payments 
spanning five years rather than six, ACM reported the "maximum period 
over which payments may be received under the contingent sale price 
agreement" as six years by including the year of the disposition in which 
it received the $140 million cash payment, although no quarterly 
payments were to be received before the tax year ended on November 30, 
1989, three days after the disposition. See 73 T.C.M. at 2200. 
 
27. The basis in the LIBOR notes was derived from the basis in the 
Citicorp notes which ACM exchanged for the LIBOR notes. See I.R.C. 
S 1031(d). Because ACM recovered one sixth of the basis of the Citicorp 
notes, or $29,250,761, during the first year of the transaction, the basis 
in the LIBOR notes after that year was $146,253,283. See app. at 110. 
While the actual cost basis of the LIBOR notes amounted to the 
$35,504,564 difference between the value of the Citicorp notes that ACM 
relinquished and the $140 million in cash that ACM received in return, 
under the ratable basis recovery rule, the cash portion of the transaction 
was aggregated with the contingent exchange portion of the transaction, 
effectively adding the $140 million in cash to the tax basis of the LIBOR 
notes. 
 
28. ACM exchanged the Citicorp notes, which as private placement 
securities were eligible for treatment under the contingent installment 
sale provisions, see I.R.C. S 453(k)(2)(A), for the LIBOR notes' stream of 
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even where the "form of the taxpayer's activities 
indisputably satisfie[s] the literal requirements" of the 
relevant statutory language, the courts must examine 
"whether the substance of those transactions was 
consistent with their form," br. at 21, because a transaction 
that is "devoid of economic substance . . . simply is not 
recognized for federal taxation purposes." Lerman v. 
Commissioner, 939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
We begin our economic substance analysis with Gregory 
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935), the 
Supreme Court's foundational exposition of economic 
substance principles under the Internal Revenue Code. In 
Gregory, as in this case, the transactions on their face 
satisfied "every element required by" the relevant statutory 
language. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468, 55 S.Ct. at 267.29 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
quarterly payments over 20 quarters so that "at least 1 payment" was to 
be "received after the close of the taxable year in which the disposition 
occurs." S 453(b). Because the amount of each quarterly payment would 
depend on the variable three-month LIBOR, the "maximum selling price" 
could "not be determined as of the close of the taxable year in which the 
. . . disposition occurr[ed]." Temp. Treas. Reg. S 15a.453-1(c). 
Accordingly, ACM's transactions satisfied the literal terms of each 
requirement necessary to trigger the application of the ratable basis 
recovery rule providing for recovery of the basis of the relinquished 
assets "in equal annual increments" over each of the "taxable years in 
which payment may be received." S 15a.453-1(c). 
 
29. We analyze the economic substance of ACM's transactions according 
to principles that were well established when the transactions occurred, 
but note that partnership transactions carried out on or after May 12, 
1994, also would be subject to Treasury Regulations which provide that 
partnership transactions "must be entered into for a substantial 
business purpose," that the "[t]he form of each partnership transaction 
must be respected under substance over form principles," and that "the 
tax consequences . . . to each partner of partnership operations . . . 
must accurately reflect the partners' income agreement." Treas. Reg. 
S 1.701-2(a). These regulations further provide that "if a partnership is 
formed or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose 
of which is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners' 
aggregate federal tax liability . . . the Commissioner can recast the 
transaction for federal tax purposes" by determining that "[t]he 
partnership's items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit should be 
 
                                29 
 
 
 
taxpayer, instead of transferring stock from her wholly- 
owned corporation directly to herself which would have 
generated taxable dividends, created a new corporation, 
transferred the stock to the new corporation, then 
liquidated the new corporation, transferred the stock to 
herself, and asserted that she had not recognized any 
taxable gain because she had received the stock"in 
pursuance of a plan of reorganization" within the meaning 
of I.R.C. S 112(g). Although the transactions satisfied each 
element of the statute, which defined "reorganization" as a 
transfer of assets between corporations under common 
control, the Court found that "[t]he whole undertaking, 
though conducted according to the [statutory] terms . . . 
was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance 
masquerading as a corporate reorganization." Id. at 469, 55 
S.Ct. at 268. 
 
The Court stated that "if a reorganization in reality was 
effected" any "ulterior [tax avoidance] purpose . . . will be 
disregarded" and the transaction will be respected for tax 
purposes. Id., 55 S.Ct. at 267. The Court emphasized, 
however, that where the transactions merely "put on the 
form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for 
concealing its real character" which was a "preconceived 
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reallocated . . . or [t]he claimed tax treatment should otherwise be 
adjusted or modified." Treas. Reg. S 1.701-2(b). 
 
The regulations set forth, as an example of a transaction whose tax 
consequences would be altered or disregarded thereunder, a transaction 
in which a foreign corporation, a domestic corporation, and a promoter 
form a partnership "[p]ursuant to a plan a principal purpose of which is 
to generate artificial losses and thereby shelter from federal taxation a 
substantial amount of income," and engage in a series of offsetting 
purchases and sales in which "any purported business purpose for the 
transaction is insignificant in comparison to the tax benefits that would 
result if the transaction were respected for federal tax purposes." Treas. 
Reg. S 1.701-2(d), Example 7. Because these regulations do not apply to 
ACM's transactions, which were completed well before the 1994 effective 
date of the regulations, we have no occasion to consider whether the 
economic substance analysis required under these regulations would 
differ from the analysis required under the judicially defined economic 
substance doctrines that we apply. 
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plan . . . not to reorganize a business," but rather "to 
transfer . . . . shares to the [taxpayer]," the transaction was 
not, in reality, "the thing which the statute intended." 
Viewed according to their substance rather than their form, 
the Court found, the transactions fell "outside the plain 
intent of the statute" and therefore could not be treated in 
accordance with their form without "exalt[ing] artifice above 
reality." Id. at 469-70, 55 S.Ct. at 267-68. Thus, pursuant 
to Gregory, we must "look beyond the form of [the] 
transaction" to determine whether it has the"economic 
substance that [its] form represents," Kirchman v. 
Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1989), 
because regardless of its form, a transaction that is "devoid 
of economic substance" must be disregarded for tax 
purposes and "cannot be the basis for a deductible loss." 
Lerman, 939 F.2d at 45; accord United States v. Wexler, 31 
F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1994).30 
 
In applying these principles, we must view the 
transactions "as a whole, and each step, from the 
commencement . . . to the consummation . . . is relevant." 
Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1959); 
accord Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 
334, 65 S.Ct. 707, 708 (1945). The inquiry into whether the 
taxpayer's transactions had sufficient economic substance 
to be respected for tax purposes turns on both the 
"objective economic substance of the transactions" and the 
"subjective business motivation" behind them. Casebeer v. 
Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); accord 
Lerman, 939 F.2d at 53-54 (noting that sham transaction 
has been defined as a transaction that "has no business 
purpose or economic effect other than the creation of tax 
deductions" and holding that taxpayer was not entitled "to 
claim `losses' when none in fact were sustained"). However, 
these distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not 
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30. The courts have distinguished between "shams in fact" where the 
reported transactions never occurred and "shams in substance" which 
"actually occurred but that lack the substance their form represents." 
Kirchman, 862 F.2d at 1492; accord Lerman, 939 F.2d at 49 n.6. 
Because it is undisputed that ACM's transactions actually occurred, we 
confine our inquiry to the question of whether their economic substance 
corresponds to their form. 
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constitute discrete prongs of a "rigid two-step analysis," but 
rather represent related factors both of which inform the 
analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient 
substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected 
for tax purposes. Casebeer, 909 F.2d at 1363; accord 
James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th Cir. 
1990); Rose v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 
1989). For the reasons that follow, we find that both the 
objective analysis of the actual economic consequences of 
ACM's transactions and the subjective analysis of their 
intended purposes support the Tax Court's conclusion that 
ACM's transactions did not have sufficient economic 
substance to be respected for tax purposes.31 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. While it is clear that a transaction such as ACM's that has neither 
objective non-tax economic effects nor subjective non-tax purposes 
constitutes an economic sham whose tax consequences must be 
disregarded, and equally clear that a transaction that has both objective 
non-tax economic significance and subjective non-tax purposes 
constitutes an economically substantive transaction whose tax 
consequences must be respected, it is also well established that where 
a transaction objectively affects the taxpayer's net economic position, 
legal relations, or non-tax business interests, it will not be disregarded 
merely because it was motivated by tax considerations. See, e.g., 
Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69, 55 S.Ct. at 267 ("if a reorganization in 
reality was effected . . . the ulterior purpose will be disregarded"), 
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 115 F.3d at 512 (emphasizing that 
Gregory and its progeny "do not allow the Commissioner to disregard 
economic transactions . . . which result in actual, non-tax-related 
changes in economic position" regardless of "tax-avoidance motive" and 
refusing to disregard role of taxpayer's foreign subsidiary which 
performed a "recognizable business activity" of securing loans and 
processing payments for parent in foreign markets in exchange for 
legitimate profit); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 127-28 
& n.19 (2d Cir. 1956) (refusing to disregard tax effects of debenture 
issue 
which "affected . . . legal relations" between taxpayer and its corporate 
parent by financing subsidiary's acquisition of venture used to further 
its 
non-tax business interests). In analyzing both the objective and 
subjective aspects of ACM's transaction in this case where the objective 
attributes of an economically substantive transaction were lacking, we 
do not intend to suggest that a transaction which has actual, objective 
effects on a taxpayer's non-tax affairs must be disregarded merely 
because it was motivated by tax considerations. 
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1. Objective Aspects of the Economic Sham Analysis 
 
In assessing the economic substance of a taxpayer's 
transactions, the courts have examined "whether the 
transaction has any practical economic effects other than 
the creation of income tax losses," Jacobson v. 
Commissioner, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted), and have refused to 
recognize the tax consequences of transactions that were 
devoid of "nontax substance" because they"did not 
appreciably affect [the taxpayer's] beneficial interest except 
to reduce his tax." Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 
366, 81 S.Ct. 130, 135 (1960). In Knetsch, the taxpayer had 
purchased annuity savings bonds from an insurance 
company, borrowed virtually their entire value against 
them, made payments back to the insurance company, and 
characterized those payments as deductible interest. 
Because the borrowing against the bonds had reduced their 
value to a mere "pittance," leaving the taxpayer with 
nothing of value apart from tax deductions, the Court 
concluded that the net effect of the transfers between the 
taxpayer and the insurance company amounted only to 
payment of a "fee for providing the facade of `loans' whereby 
the [taxpayers] sought to reduce their . . . taxes" and 
therefore could not be characterized as payment of interest 
on a debt. Id. at 366, 81 S.Ct. at 135 (citation and internal 
quotation omitted). 
 
In Weller, 270 F.2d 294, we examined a similar series of 
transactions in which the taxpayer purchased annuity 
policies, pledged them as collateral to borrow funds, used 
the borrowed funds to prepay future annual premiums on 
the policies, prepaid `interest' on an anticipated additional 
loans against the policies, then used the proceeds of the 
additional loans to repay the earlier loans, and sought to 
deduct the prepayments as interest. See id. at 295-96. 
Applying Gregory, we disallowed the deduction on the 
grounds that "transactions which do not vary control or 
change the flow of economic benefits are to be dismissed 
from consideration" if they "do not appreciably change the 
taxpayer's financial position." Id. at 297 (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). We therefore disregarded the 
transactions for tax purposes even though the taxpayer had 
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made actual payments which satisfied the statutory 
definition of an "amount paid . . . on indebtedness incurred 
. . . to purchase a single premium life insurance contract," 
much as the Supreme Court had disregarded the 
transaction in Gregory despite the fact that the taxpayer 
had created "a real, valid, corporate entity" and carried out 
a transaction that was "within the terms of the statute." Id. 
at 296-98. 
 
In the context of property dispositions, the courts have 
applied the economic substance doctrine in a similar 
manner to disregard transactions which, although involving 
actual transactions disposing of property at a loss, had no 
net economic effect on the taxpayer's economic position, 
either because the taxpayer retained the opportunity to 
reacquire the property at the same price, or because the 
taxpayer offset the economic effect of the disposition by 
acquiring assets virtually identical to those relinquished. 
See, e.g., Lerman, 939 F.2d at 48; Merryman v. 
Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1989); Kirchman, 862 
F.2d at 1488, 1492-93; Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 
494, 501 (7th Cir. 1988). Although the taxpayers in these 
cases actually and objectively disposed of their property, 
the courts examined the dispositions in their broader 
economic context and refused to recognize them for tax 
purposes where other aspects of the taxpayers' transactions 
offset the consequences of the disposition, resulting in no 
net change in the taxpayer's economic position. In light of 
these cases, we must determine whether the Tax Court 
erred in concluding that ACM's exchange of the Citicorp 
notes for contingent-payment LIBOR notes which gave rise 
to the tax consequences at issue generated only "a 
phantom loss" that was not "economically inherent in the 
object of the sale" and did not have "economic substance 
separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely 
by tax reduction." 73 T.C.M. at 2215. For the following 
reasons, we conclude that it did not. 
 
2. Objective Economic Consequences of ACM's 
Transactions 
 
While the Tax Court's analysis focused on the lack of 
non-tax purposes behind ACM's transactions rather than 
 
                                34 
 
 
 on their objective economic consequences, the court made 
numerous findings that were indicative of the lack of 
objective economic consequences arising from ACM's short- 
swing acquisition and disposition of the Citicorp notes 
between November 3 and November 27, 1989. The court 
noted that ACM sold the Citicorp notes "for consideration 
equal to [their] purchase price" and thus did not realize any 
gain or loss in the notes' principal value. 73 T.C.M. at 2215 
n.19.32 Moreover, as the court observed, the lack of change 
in principal value was not merely coincidental, but was 
inherent in the terms of the notes and of the transactions 
in which they were traded. See id. at 2219-20. Likewise, the 
court found that the interest income generated by the notes 
could not have a material effect on ACM's financial position 
because the Citicorp notes paid interest at a rate that 
varied only nominally from the rate that ACM's cash 
contributions "were already earning . . . in . . . deposit 
accounts before the notes were acquired," resulting in only 
a $3,500 difference in yield over the 24-day holding period, 
a difference which was obliterated by the transaction costs 
associated with marketing private placement notes to third 
parties. Id. at 2218, 2220-21. 
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32. As contemplated in transaction proposals drafted before ACM was 
formed, the Citicorp notes were sold for an amount equal to their 
purchase price. See app. at 275-77, 321, 300. 
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